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I.

INTRODUCTION

The people of Alaska have included in their constitution' a provision guaranteeing to all persons the equal protection of the laws.2 This
section and the other sections of Alaska's Declaration of Rights are
not exceptional in their formulation. 3 The Declaration essentially restates the traditional substantive and procedural rights found in the
Bill of Rights 4 and the fourteenth amendment 5 of the United States
Copyright © 1986 by Alaska Law Review
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1. The Constitution of the State of Alaska was ratified by the voters of the state
on April 24, 1956. It had been drafted at a convention that met from November 8,
1955, to February 5, 1956. The constitution went into effect upon Alaska's admission
as a state of the United States on January 3, 1959. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,

1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED

STATES, NATIONAL AND STATE, Alaska iii (1982). See generally FISCHER, ALASKA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1975). The Alaska Constitution is modeled primarily after the United States Constitution, and to a lesser degree on the constitutions of
Hawaii and New Jersey. Id. at 67.
2. The guarantee is contained in the constitution's first article, the Declaration of
Rights. The Declaration of Rights protects many of the same fundamental rights as
the federal Bill of Rights, including the rights of free speech, free assembly, and due
process. The equal protection guarantee is contained in ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1:
Inherent Rights. The constitution is dedicated to the principles that all
persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the
enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry; that all persons are equal
and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law; and
that all persons have corresponding obligations to the people and to the
State.
3. Dionisopoulos, Indiana, 1851, Alaska 1956: A Century of Difference in State
Constitutions,34 IND. L.J. 34, 37-39 (1958). See A. STRUM, TRENDS IN STATE CONSTITUTION-MAKING 1966-1972, at 45-46 (1973).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
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Constitution. Although Alaska's wording that "all persons are equal
and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the
law" is somewhat different from the federal guarantee that no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws," the Alaska Supreme Court has given little heed to the difference in language between the state and federal equal protection provisions. The Alaska Supreme Court has, however, given great attention
to the development of an independent analytical doctrine with which

to apply the state equal protection guarantee. In the hands of the
Alaska Supreme Court, equal protection under the state constitution is

significantly different from equal protection under the federal
Constitution.
This article is an examination and evaluation of these differences.
As such, it is in keeping with the now well-established emphasis on the
importance of state constitutional law as a contemporary source of
protection for civil rights and liberties in an era of perceived United
States Supreme Court retreat. 6 At a minimum, the Alaska court's ap-

proach is an interesting example of state judicial activism. But it is
much more. Academically, the equal protection analysis adopted by

the Alaska court is of broader interest because it closely approximates
the analytical approach Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall7
has long argued should be employed under the federal Constitution.
Thus, Alaska provides a case study and, perhaps, an appropriate
model for the nation. Practically, the Alaska Supreme Court has provided attorneys in Alaska with a broad and powerful litigation tool for
challenging state and local government classifications.
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
6. See, eg., Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions- Away from a
ReactionaryApproach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981); Galie, The Other Supreme
Courts: JudicialActivism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 731
(1982); Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and
State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165 (1984) [hereinafter cited as E Pluribus]; Linde, First
Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as First Things First]; Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow:
Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. REv.
353 (1984); Developments in the Law - The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324 (1982); Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretationof the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1977); Project
Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
271 (1973).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 104-31.
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Much of the development of the independent state approach to
equal protection analysis in Alaska has taken place in response to the
state court's dissatisfaction with the equal protection doctrine of the
United States Supreme Court. In order to better understand the

evolution of the Alaska constitutional doctrine, this article begins with
a summary of the development of federal doctrine under the fourteenth amendment. Next, the article considers the development of
equal protection analysis under the state constitution from the initial
close tracking of the federal standards to the articulation and refinement of Alaska's own sliding scale, balancing approach. Finally, the

article seeks to evaluate the Alaska equal protection analysis.
II.

A.

OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE

s
Equal Protection Analysis Prior to the Warren Court

The fourteenth amendment 9 to the United States Constitution
was proposed by Congress in 1866 and ratified in 1868. As a product
of radical reconstruction following the Civil War, the amendment reflected Congress's desire to ensure a sound constitutional foundation
for protection of the rights of recently freed former slaves. 10 Although
an early decision of the Supreme Court indicated that the Court
doubted "whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview" of the equal protection
clause," the Court soon acknowledged that the clause's broad language was not limited merely to racial classifications. 12 As Professor
Bickel observed: "[S]ection I of the fourteenth amendment, on its
face, deals not only with racial discrimination, but also with discrimination whether or not based on color. This cannot have been accidental .... ,113 Thus the broad language of the equal protection clause
8. The "Warren Court" refers to the United States Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Earl Warren, who served from 1953 to 1969. See infra text accompanying
notes 38-40.
9. U.S. CoNST.amend. XIV. The equal protection clause provides:
No State shall ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. § 1.
10. See generally Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. RV.1 (1955); Frank & Munro, The Original Understandingof
"EqualProtection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421.

11. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
12. See, e.g., Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886)
(holding that corporations as well as natural persons are protected by the equal protection clause).
13. Bickel, supra note 10, at 60.
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afforded, at least potentially, a wide scope for judicial review of state

legislative classifications.
Until the Warren Court era, however, the Supreme Court only
infrequently used the equal protection clause to increase federal con-

trol of state actions. Although the Supreme Court did utilize the
clause to strike down some discrimination against blacks' 4 and

Asians,15 the Court also acquiesced to the end of reconstruction efforts
and to the imposition of Jim Crow segregation by its acceptance of the

infamous doctrine of "separate but equal." 1 6 The equal protection

clause was almost never utilized in challenges to social and economic
legislation, and when the clause was invoked, the Court employed a
deferential standard of review.17 In fact, in 1927, near the height of
the era of judicial activism in using the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to strike down economic legislation, Justice

Holmes could scornfully label an equal protection
argument as "the
18
usual last resort of constitutional arguments."
One aspect of federal equal protection doctrine from the preWarren Court period is of particular interest both because it continues
14. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
15. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
16. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341 (1949), is the leading study of equal protection doctrine prior to the Warren Court
era. Professor Gunther has characterized federal equal protection during this period
as follows:
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention
in most contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only
that government must not impose differences on treatment "except upon
some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation," as
Justice Jackson put it in the Railway Express case. . . . That "old" variety
of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the classification in the statute reasonably relate
to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due process, equal protection
scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying "fundamental values"
and restraining legislative ends. And usually that rational classification requirement was readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and purpose; perfect congruence between means and
ends was not required; judges allowed legislators flexibility to act on the basis of broadly accurate generalizations and tolerated considerable overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness in classification schemes. Only in special,
limited contexts was equal protection found to have a deeper bite during
most of its history - most notably in racial discrimination cases, in view of
this historical background of the 14th Amendment.
G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 587 (1 1th ed. 1985).
18. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). Nevertheless, during the period from
1900 to the mid-1930's, the Supreme Court did strike down some 20 state and local
economic regulatory statutes as violative of equal protection. II DORSEN, BENDER,
NEUBORNE & LAW, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 342-43
(4th ed. 1979).

1986]

EQUAL PROTECTION

to be an issue today and because it has been an issue influential in the
development of an independent equal protection standard under the
Alaska Constitution. As indicated, the Supreme Court applied a deferential standard when reviewing challenged economic and social legislation. The Court would inquire only to determine that the
legislature had some rational basis for its choice of the classification
used in the challenged enactment. But the Court articulated the standard by which to determine such rationality in very different language.
Some formulations were deferential in the extreme, while other statements of the standard implied a considerable scope for judicial review
of legislative judgments. These divergent standards continued to exist
and to be employed by the Court, often with disregard for their apparent inconsistency. In fact, these divergent standards continue to be
employed and hotly debated today.19
The Supreme Court's opinions in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co.,20 a 1911 decision, andF S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,21 a
1920 decision, are classic examples of the polar extremes of the
Court's formulations of the rational basis test. In Lindsley, the Court
articulated the standard as follows:
The rules by which this contention [that the legislative classification
violates equal protection] must be tested, as is shown by repeated
decisions of this court, are these: 1. The equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment does not take from the state the power to
classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done
only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely
arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not
offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the
existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must
be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law
must carry the burden of showing that it does
not rest upon any
22
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
In contrast, the Royster standard suggests a substantial, active role for
a court reviewing an equal protection challenge to economic regulatory legislation. Here the Court stated: "The classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
19. GUNTHER & SCHAUER,
1984).
20. 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
21. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
22. 220 U.S. at 78-79.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

148 (10th ed. 1980 & Supp.
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alike."' 23 Controversy continues to swirl around the Supreme Court's
continuing use of these divergent standards. As discussed below, the
Warren Court's apparent adoption of a standard of review even less
24
demanding than the Lindsley formulation and the Burger Court's
subsequent sporadic use of the more rigorous Royster standard is one
source of criticism of contemporary federal equal protection doctrine.25 Additionally, the Alaska Supreme Court's preference for the
more active judicial review of the Royster standard is perhaps the primary factor leading to the26 state court's adoption of its independent
equal protection doctrine.
Two decisions of the 1940's are particularly important in setting
the stage for the development of contemporary equal protection doctrine under the Warren and Burger Courts. One is Korematsu v.
United States.2 7 Although Korematsu is best known for upholding the
removal and internment of Japanese Americans from the American
west coast during World War II, a holding that "falls into the ugly
abyss of racism, ' 28 the majority opinion written by Justice Black did
state that racial classifications are "immediately suspect" and that
"courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. ' 29 This notion
was to become a foundation of the first branch of the Warren Court's
equal protection doctrine: suspect classification equal protection
analysis.
The second decision, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,30 is
a more complicated precursor to modem equal protection development. In Skinner, the plaintiff challenged an Oklahoma statute which
provided that individuals who committed two or more felonies involving moral turpitude could be ordered sterilized. The act, however,
provided that " 'offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory
laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses, shall not come
or be considered within the terms of this Act.' "31 In short, whitecollar criminals would not be subject to sterilization, while individuals
such as Skinner, who had been convicted of chicken stealing once and
armed robbery twice, could be sterilized.
Justice Douglas, the author of the Court's Skinner opinion, faced
a doctrinal dilemma. He acknowledged the normal deference shown
23. 253 U.S. at 415.
24. The "Burger Court" refers to the United States Supreme Court under its current Chief Justice, Warren Burger, who has served since 1969.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 41, 79-83.
26. See infra sections III A. and B.
27. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
28. Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
29. Id at 216.
30. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
31. Id. at 537.
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to legislative classifications: "[i]f we had here only a question as to a
State's classification of crimes, such as embezzlement or larceny, no
substantial federal question would be raised."' 32 But Justice Douglas
decided the Court could nevertheless find that the statute violated
equal protection because the Court was dealing with "legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race."'33 The United States Constitution, of course, nowhere explicitly
identifies procreation as a fundamental right. Douglas possibly could
have found such an interest to be a fundamental right had he employed substantive due process analysis. He then could have asserted
directly that the state's interests supporting the legislation did not justify the burden placed on the "right." Such an approach was inconceivable, however, to a Court that had only recently terminated the so35
called Lochner era 34 and rejected economic substantive due process.
Instead, Justice Douglas ignored the issue of the source of the fundamental right to procreate, renounced any intention to engage in substantive due process analysis, and insisted instead that the issue
involved was one of equal protection. As he explained:
We mention these matters [that Skinner might be deprived of a basic liberty] not to reexamine the scope of the police power of the
States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that
strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in
violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws. The
guaranty of "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." . . . When the law lays an unequal hand on
those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense
and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a disselected a particular race or nationality for
crimination as if it had
36
oppressive treatment.
Thus, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the classification
32. Id. at 540.
33. Id. at 541.
34. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Substantive due process review
refers to the idea that "due process of law" imposes restrictions upon the substance of
what governments may do or the subject matter over which they may act and not
solely upon the procedures by which they may do it. The doctrine was often invoked
during the period between the turn of the century and the mid-1930's to overturn
statutes regulating economic affairs. Lochner is generally regarded as the first of the
economic substantive due process cases. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTiONAL LAW 436-43 (2d ed. 1983).
35. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
36. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369

(1886)).
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because the classification affected what Justice Douglas found to be a
basic right, not because classifications between different kinds of felonies were inherently suspect. In this way Skinner laid the foundation
for the second major branch of the Warren Court's equal protection
37
doctrine: fundamental rights equal protection analysis.
B.

Equal Protection Analysis in the Warren Court
Earl Warren was appointed to the Supreme Court as Chief Justice

in 1953. On May 17, 1954, the Court issued its unanimous opinion
written by Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Board of Education.3 8 In

overturning the doctrine of separate but equal,3 9 the Court also initi-

ated an era of revolutionary judicial activism that reached its height
during the 1960's. By the end of that decade, the Warren Court had

articulated a comprehensive new equal protection doctrine. The new
doctrine utilized two quite distinct levels of review: rational basis and
strict scrutiny.40
During this period, the Court applied a very passive form of judicial review to challenged classifications in social and economic legislation. The Warren Court standard was even more deferential to the
legislature than the standard articulated in Lindsley. The Court would
uphold such a classification if it could conceive of a possible rational
basis that would justify the legislature's decision. For example, Chief
Justice Warren described the lower tier, rational basis test in 1969 as
follows:
The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause only if based on reasons
totally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal. Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are
otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will
be set aside
41
only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them.

In sharp contrast to this highly deferential standard, the other,
37. The suggestion that a more active judicial review was justified when basic
rights or "discrete and insular minorities" were involved had previously been made by
Justice Stone in his famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304

U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. Although Brown itself only abandoned the doctrine of separate but equal in
the field of public education, subsequent per curiam opinions prohibited segregation in
other state facilities and services. See, GUNTHER, supra note 17, at 639 n. 1.
40. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of EvolvingDoctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
41. McDonald v. Dd. of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); see, e.g., McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
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more strict level of review produced a degree of judicial intervention
and searching review of legislative classification previously unknown
under the equal protection clause. The Warren Court applied this
strict scrutiny in two sets of circumstances: when the Court concluded that the classification involved a suspect criterion such as race
or when the Court found that the classification impinged upon a fundamental right. 42 Under the heightened review of the Warren Court's
second tier, the Court examined a challenged classification both as to
its means, which it required to be "necessary," and as to its "ends,"
which it required to be "compelling." If the classification was not necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, the legislation violated
equal protection.
Under this two-tier scheme, the determinative stage of the analysis was the initial stage, when the Court decided which level of review
to apply. For, as Professor Gunther observed in an often-quoted passage: "Some situations evoked the aggressive 'new' equal protection,
with scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact; in other conreigned, with minimal scrutexts, the deferential 'old' equal protection '43
tiny in theory and virtually none in fact."
The suspect classification branch of the Court's strict scrutiny approach was not highly controversial. 44 The approach scrupulously
maintained the suspect nature of racial classifications, previously indicated in Korematsu,45 and established the suspectness of classifications
based on alienage4 6 and national origin. 47 The main issue involved in
this aspect of the Court's analysis was the extent to which other classifications such as wealth, gender, mental retardation, and others could
be added to the ranks of the suspect. Advocates of such expansions
were quick to realize, for example, that if wealth could be established
as a suspect classification, a fundamental reordering in access to governmental assistance might be accomplished. 48 Questions as to the expansion of suspect classifications remained for the Burger Court.
By far the most controversial aspect of the Warren Court's equal
protection doctrine was the fundamental rights equal protection analy42. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), is regarded as the court's first full
statement of fundamental rights equal protection analysis.
43. Gunther, supra note 40, at 8 (footnote omitted).
44. See generallyBrest, Foreword: In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,
90 HARV. L. RV.1 (1976).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388

U.S. 1 (1967).
46. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
47. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
48. See Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. Rv.7 (1969).
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sis. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson 4 9
expressed the main points of criticism. In Shapiro the majority opinion had overturned legislation establishing one year residency requirements before an applicant was eligible for welfare benefits. The
opinion reasoned that the distinction between new and longer-term
residents placed a burden on the indigent person's right to travel that
was not justified by any compelling state interest. Although Justice
Harlan recognized a constitutional source for the right to travel, 50 he
found the majority's fundamental rights equal protection approach to
be "particularly unfortunate and unnecessary." 5 1 To Harlan, the doctrine was unfortunate because he concluded that "[v]irtually every
state statute affects important rights" so that "to extend the 'compelling interest' rule to all cases in which such rights are affected would
go far toward making this Court a 'super-legislature.' "52 Harlan felt
the doctrine was unnecessary because, if the right was assured by the
53
Constitution, infringements of the right could be dealt with directly.
However, if the classification affected matters that were not mentioned
in the Constitution, he knew of "nothing which entitles this Court to
pick out particular activities, characterize them as 'fundamental,' and
give them added protection under an unusually stringent equal protec'54
tion test."
Despite such cries of alarm over the potential for judicial activism
under the fundamental rights equal protection doctrine, the Warren
Court, in fact, added few interests to the list of fundamental rights.5 5
Such rights were limited to criminal appeals, 56 voting, 57 and interstate
travel. 58 At the time of transition from the Warren to the Burger
Court, however, advocates and commentators were seeking to push
59
forward the frontiers of highly protected interests.
C. Equal Protection Analysis in the Burger Court
The change in Justices from the Warren Court to the Burger
Court has not produced a sharp repudiation of the equal protection
doctrine of the 1960's. On the surface at least, during the 1970's and
1980's the Supreme Court has largely retained the doctrinal outline of
49. 394 U.S. 618, 655-77 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Gunther, supra note 40, at 8-9.
E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Gunther, supra note 40, at 9-10.

at 663-71.
at 661.
at 661-62.
at 662.
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the Warren Court two-tier analysis.60 Within that general doctrinal
framework, however, the Burger Court has made it clear that the upper level of equal protection review is not expanding. The Court has
not explicitly declared new classifications to be suspect 61 nor has it
found additional rights to be fundamental under the equal protection
clause.6 2 Still, the Burger Court has muddied the waters and obscured
the rigid doctrinal lines of the Warren Court's approach. Increasingly
the Court has determined cases without articulating a standard of review and applied a sui generis analysis that is neither as weak as rational basis review nor as strong as strict scrutiny and is highly
dependent on the particular facts of the case. 63 With regard to some
classifications such as gender, this approach has been formalized to the
point that many refer to a third tier of review: "intermediate level"
review or "heightened scrutiny." 64
The Burger Court's retreat from the broad implications of the
strict scrutiny doctrine was most clearly shown in San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez,65 where parents from a school
district with a low property tax base challenged the Texas school finance system, which permitted wealthy school districts to spend much
greater sums per student while taxing residents at much lower rates
than residents of poor districts. The parents asserted that strict scrutiny should be used to review the system because wealth should be
regarded as a suspect classification and because education should be
regarded as a fundamental right. Concerning wealth, the majority
opinion written by Justice Powell found that the class the plaintiffs
sought to represent was too amorphous to reflect a meaningful wealth
classification. 66 In addition, the Court indicated that in its prior
wealth cases the class members had been completely unable to pay for
a desired benefit and, therefore, absolutely deprived of the benefit, circumstances not present in the Texas school finance system.6 7 The
Court concluded that the system did "not operate to the peculiar dis60. GUNTHER, supra note 17, at 589, 591; Seeburger, The Muddle of the Middle
Tier: The Coming Crisis in Equal Protection, 48 Mo. L. REv. 587, 589-90 (1983). But
105 S. Ct. 3249
cf City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, - U.S. -,
(1985), discussed infra note 78.
61. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)
(Court declined to apply heightened review to differential treatment based on age).
62. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(Court declined to add education as a fundamental guaranteed right).
63. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

64. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see generally, Comment, The
"SubstantialRelation" Question in Gender DiscriminationCases, 52 U.
149 (1985).
65. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
66. Id. at 28.
67. Id. at 19-25.

CHi. L.
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advantage of any suspect class."' 68 In addition to rejecting wealth as a
suspect classification, subsequent cases have also rejected efforts to add
age 69 or mental retardation 70 to the list of suspect classifications.
In Rodriguez, the majority also refused to expand fundamental
rights protected under equal protection to include a right to education.
Although Justice Powell acknowledged the importance of education,
he stated that "the importance of a service performed by the State does
not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. ' 7 1 Citing
Justice Harlan's dissent in Shapiro, which said that applying strict
scrutiny to so many important interests would place the court in the
role of a "super-legislature," 72 Justice Powell concluded:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal
significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor
is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as
the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether
there is a right to73education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution.
The majority then went on to find that education was not explicitly
made a right under the Constitution nor was it implicitly guaranteed
as necessary to effectuate the right to vote or to speak. 74
In other decisions the Burger Court has declined to find interests
in housing 75 or welfare benefits 76 to be fundamental for purposes of
fundamental rights equal protection analysis. In fact, those rights
"implicitly" guaranteed by the Constitution have been limited to those
that the Warren Court previously identified. 77 Thus it appears that a
majority of the Burger Court has preserved the doctrinal structure of
the Warren Court's strict scrutiny analysis for suspect classifications
and classifications burdening fundamental rights, but has refused to
68. Id. at 28.
69. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); MassachusettsBd. of Retirement, 427

U.S. at 307.
70.
71.
72.
73.

City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3249.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30.
Id. at 30-3 1. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34.

74. Id. at 35-39. The Court did note that there was no indication that under the

Texas system each child was not given at least the opportunity to acquire basic skills,
and left open the question of the constitutionality of an absolute educational denial.
75. Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
76. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970).
77. Note, Alternative Models of Equal Protection Analysis: Plyler v. Doe, 24
B.C.L. REv. 1363, 1372 (1983).
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78
expand the application of that doctrine to new areas.
The Burger Court's departure from the doctrines of the Warren
Court is more readily apparent with regard to classifications involving
less than strict scrutiny. Reaction against the rigidity of the strict twotier model would almost inevitably have led to some more varied options for judicial review. To date, however, the Court has not agreed
upon any set formula. Equal protection doctrine below the level of
strict scrutiny has become and remains an area of considerable

confusion.
One area of doctrinal confusion is in the present Court's treat-

ment of economic and social legislation. As Justice Powell has observed, "The Court has employed numerous formulations for the
'rational basis' test. . . . Members of the Court continue to hold divergent views on the clarity with which a legislative purpose must appear,. . . and about the degree of deference afforded the legislature in
suiting means to ends, compare [Lindsley] with [Royster Guano
78. The Court's most recent equal protection decision may indicate that even the
doctrinal stalwart of the tiers of review may have lost the support of a majority of the
Court. In City of Cleburne, 105 S.Ct. at 3249, the Court considered the city's appeal
from a decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had held that mental
retardation was a "quasi-suspect" classification so that in reviewing a statute utilizing
it, a court must apply "intermediate-level" scrutiny. The opinion of the Court was
written by Justice White and rejected the doctrinal analysis of the court of appeals.
White outlined the traditional two-tiered format of rational basis review for most legislation and strict scrutiny if a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin.
Id. at 3254-55. He also noted that gender classifications called for a "heightened standard of review." Id. at 3255. White found, however, that the Fifth Circuit was mistaken when it applied heightened review to the classification based on retardation: a
mere rational basis standard should apply. Id. at 3255-58. Nevertheless, the opinion
concluded that the particular use of mental retardation as a criterion for the zoning
decision challenged in the suit lacked a rational basis. Id. at 3258-60.
What is of particular interest to the status of equal protection doctrine, however,
are the two additional opinions filed in the case. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Burger, expressed his view that the two-tiered analysis was inadequate and that all
cases should be decided by a rational basis approach. Under Stevens's rational basis
approach, however, the word rational "includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality
that must always characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially." Id. at 3261 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, joined by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun, wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part. Justice Marshall reiterated his long-held view (discussed infra in
Section II. D.) that the level of scrutiny should vary with the importance of the interest adversely affected and the invidiousness of the basis upon which the classification is
drawn. He concluded that: "When a zoning ordinance works to exclude the retarded
from all residential districts in a community, these two considerations require that the
ordinance be convincingly justified as substantially furthering legitimate and important purposes." Id. at 3265 (citations omitted). In Cleburne, therefore, five Justices
have joined opinions expressing equal protection doctrines different from the more
traditional formulation contained in Justice White's opinion for the Court. It thus
appears that the doctrinal disarray of the Burger Court has further increased.
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Co. ].,, 79 Although the Burger Court has most frequently followed the
extreme deference of the Warren era, 80 majorities in some cases have
employed a more rigorous standard. 81 Professor Gunther analyzed
the early Burger Court cases that applied a less deferential standard in
a study that proposed that the Court employ a heightened inquiry into
the appropriateness of legislative means. 8 2 Although the United States
Supreme Court has not settled on such an analysis, the Gunther article
has been influential in the initial development of Alaska's equal pro83
tection doctrine.
The Burger Court has also taken steps to occupy the doctrinal
ground between rational basis and strict scrutiny review. These developments are most clearly shown in cases involving gender classifications. At first, the Court declined to adopt strict scrutiny in reviewing
gender classifications and, in conformity with the two-tier doctrine,
indicated that it would apply a rational basis standard of review. The
Court's decisions striking down such classifications, however, reveal
that the level of review actually applied by the Court was certainly
higher than rational basis.8 4 In 1976, in Craig v. Boren,8 5 the Court
began to acknowledge that in judging the constitutionality of gender
classifications it applied a standard more rigorous than rational basis
but less demanding than strict scrutiny. Justice Brennan's opinion
stated a standard that was clearly more searching than rational basis:
"To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."'8 6 Still, the course of the Court's view of the appropriate standard to apply to gender classifications has not been smooth. In 1973, a
four-Justice plurality opinion had indicated that classifications based
on sex were inherently suspect,8 7 yet in 1981 a majority applied the
intermediate test laxly to review gender classification in the Selective
79. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 243 n.4 (1981) (Powell, J.,dissenting)
(citations omitted). See supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
80. See, e.g., United States R.R. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).

81. E.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); see
also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
82. Gunther, supra note 40.
83. See infra Section III.B.
84. E.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971).
85. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
86. Id. at 197. Justice Powell explicitly acknowledged that this standard was
greater than rational basis but less than strict scrutiny. 429 U.S. at 210-11 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion of Brennan,
J., joined by Douglas, White, and Marshall, J.J.).
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Service Act. 88 One year later, Justice O'Connor, who had joined the
Court in the interim, wrote an opinion for a five-Justice majority that
applied the intermediate scrutiny standard rigorously.8 9 Furthermore,
Justice O'Connor specifically noted that since the statute in question
did not survive the majority's intermediate level review, the Court
"need not decide whether classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect." 90 The Burger Court has followed a similar up and
down course in its application of an intermediate level of review to
classifications based on illegitimacy. 91
The Burger Court has also had a tendency to decide tough equal
protection cases through the use of analyses that are highly dependent
on the specific facts of the case and that do not necessarily articulate
how the opinion fits into a more general equal protection doctrine.
Plyler v. Doe92 affords an excellent example of this confusing analysis.
Undocumented alien children attending public schools challenged a
Texas statute that cut off all state funding to a local school district if
the district admitted such children without charging them tuition for
their publicly provided education. The Court, in an opinion delivered
by Justice Brennan, found that the statute denied the undocumented
children the right to equal protection, but the opinion's analysis did
not track closely the analysis previously articulated by the Court. The
Court found that undocumented resident aliens were not a suspect
class. 93 While the Court noted that "persuasive arguments" supported
the state's position that it could withhold its benefits from "those
whose very presence within the United States is the product of their
own unlawful conduct,"' 94 those arguments were weaker when applied
to minor children of undocumented aliens, children who could neither
control their parents' conduct nor their own status. 95 Justice Brennan
stated, "It is thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for
penalizing these children for their presence within the United
88. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
89. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).

90. Id. at 724 n.9.
91. Compare Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (applying heightened scrutiny to strike down an intestate succession law barring inheritance by illegitimate children from their fathers), with Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding a law
forbidding illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers by intestate succession unless paternity was established by judicial finding during father's lifetime); compare Trimble and Lalli with Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982), and Pickett v.
Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (cases striking down Iand 2 year limits respectively from
the time of birth for suits by illegitimate child for purpose of obtaining child support).
See Seeburger, supra note 60, at 598-603.
92. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
93. Id. at 219 n.19.
94. Id. at 219.
95. Id. at 219-20.
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States."' 96 Here the Court seemed to indicate that it would judge the
statute on a rational basis standard. The opinion continued, however.
While it acknowledged that education is not a fundamental right
granted by the Constitution, the opinion stressed the general importance of education to society. The Court further noted that denying
education to the undocumented children would impose "a lifetime
hardship" upon them, and "[t]he stigma of illiteracy will mark them
for the rest of their lives."' 97 Justice Brennan concluded:
In determining the rationality of [the statute], we may appropriately
take into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims. In light of these countervailing costs, the
discrimination contained in [the statute] can hardly be considered
rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State. 98
This standard - that the statute will be judged by its rationality
but that its rationality will be determined by the importance of the
ends the government is seeking to achieve - certainly does not fit
within any of the traditional formulations of the rational basis test, nor
does it conform to any rigid notion of the newly developed intermediate level review. 99 It is rather a standard derived from and unique to
the particular circumstances of the issue before the Court.10 Four
dissenting Justices strongly criticized the use of this unique approach,10 1 while Justice Marshall, who advocates such an approach in
all cases, praised it.102
As even this brief overview makes clear, the equal protection doctrine of the past quarter century is laden with areas of controversy.
Contemporary doctrine in particular is characterized by many starts
and many stops, with all too few clear guidelines for enduring policy.
As would be expected, such an area of doctrinal uncertainty has provided a fertile field for critical commentaries. It is beyond the scope of
this article to attempt to survey this literature other than to list some
96. Id. at 220.
97. Id. at 223.
98. Id. at 223-24.
99. See id. at 217-18 & n.16.
100. Id. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 244 (Burger, J., dissenting, joined by White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor,
J.J.). Justice Burger stated:
[B]y patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed quasisuspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the Court spins out a
theory custom-tailored to the facts of these cases. In the end, we are told
little more than that the level of scrutiny employed to strike down the Texas
law applies only when illegal alien children are deprived of a public education .... If ever a court was guilty of an unabashedly result-oriented ap-

proach, this case is a prime example.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 231 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall's views are considered
infra Section II.D.
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of the most frequently referred-to examples in the margin, 10 3 and to
attempt to make appropriate references to this literature when relevant
to the evaluation of the Alaska Supreme Court's equal protection doctrine contained in Section IV below. The views of one persistent critic
and proponent of a different approach to federal equal protection analysis must be considered in some detail, however. He is Justice
Thurgood Marshall. Justice Marshall's views have provided an important stimulus to the development of Alaska's independent doctrine.
Consequently, to the extent that equal protection doctrine in Alaska
approximates Marshall's approach, developments in the state give

some basis for examining the workability of his suggestions.
D. Justice Marshall's Sliding Scale, Balancing Approach to Equal

Protection Analysis
Over the past fifteen years, Justice Marshall has developed an
equal protection analysis that differs from the expressed doctrine of
the Supreme Court. He has developed his approach in two ways: by
writing opinions dissenting from the Court's failure to extend relief
because of its rigid application of the two-tier model' ° and by writing
concurring opinions asserting that the process through which the
Court actually reached its decision was his approach, although the
majority opinion referred to traditional doctrine or failed to discuss
the doctrinal basis of its holding at all.10 5 Justice Marshall's suggested
analysis has been considered in a number of commentaries, some of
which make proposals similar to those of the Justice.106
103.

ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:

A

THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

(1980); Barrett, JudicialSupervision of Legislative Classifications- A More Modest
Role for Equal Protection?1976 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 89; Bice, StandardsofJudicialReview
Under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. RaV. 689 (1977);
Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981
(1979); Nowak, Realigning the Standards ofReview under the Equal Protection Guarantee - Prohibited,Neutral and Permissive Classification, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974);
Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1023 (1979); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and
the Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. Rv. 945 (1975).
104. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
105. Cleburne, -

U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. at 3265-68 (Marshall, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230-31 (Marshall, J., concurring).
106. Simson, A Method for Analyzing DiscriminatoryEffects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REv. 663 (1977); Wilkinson, supra note 103, at 989-98;

Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Unspecified Rights: On Protecting Fundamental
and Not-So-Fundamental "Rights" or "Interests" Through a Flexible Conception of
Equal Protection, 1977 DUKE L.J. 143; Note, Alternative Models of Equal Protection
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Justice Marshall first articulated his sliding scale approach in dissent in Dandridge v. Williams,107 a case in which the Court upheld a
state regulation that increased welfare benefits as the number of children in a family increased but imposed a maximum limit. Because the
Court found the regulation to be in the social and economic sphere, it
applied the deferential rational basis test10 8 and found in favor of the
state. Justice Marshall decried the Court's rigid application of the
two-tiered approach. Merely labelling a regulation as social or economic ignored the vast difference between a classification in a business
regulation and one that denied public assistance to a child because of
"the size of the family into which the child permits himself to be
born." 10 9 In Justice Marshall's view, the Court avoided undertaking
any analysis of the justification for such a classification "by focusing
upon the abstract dichotomy between two different approaches to
equal protection problems" that had been utilized by the Court.1 10 To
him, the case "simply def[ied] easy characterization in terms of one or
the other of these 'tests.' "I" Marshall asserted that the Court should
apply a balancing approach.
In my view, equal protection analysis of this case is not appreciably advanced by the a prioridefinition of a "right," fundamental
or otherwise. Rather, concentration must be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental
benefits that they do not receive,
and the asserted state interests in
112
support of the classification.
Applying his analysis to the facts of the case, Justice Marshall con13
cluded that the regulation violated the equal protection clause."
Justice Marshall expanded upon his views in San Antonio InAnalysis: Plyler v. Doe, 24 B.C.L. REV. 1363 (1983); Comment, Equal Protection and
Due Process: ContrastingMethods of Review Under FourteenthAmendment Doctrine,
14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 529, 545-47 (1979); Comment, Equal Protection: A
Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 76 MICH. L. Rnv. 771, 869-86 (1978).
107. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
108. Id. at 484-85.
109. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id.at 520.
112. Id. at 520-21. Justice Black had used language similar to Marshall's in a 1968
opinion for the Court although the opinion ultimately applied a strict scrutiny standard. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) ("In determining whether or
not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and
circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting,
and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification." (footnote

omitted)).
113. 397 U.S. at 522-30.
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dependentSchool Districtv. Rodriguez,114 where the Court upheld the
Texas system of school finance under a narrow application of the twotiered approach.115 In Rodriguez, Marshall not only asserted that the
Court should employ his approach, he also maintained that his analysis more accurately reflected the process the Court actually employed
in reaching its equal protection decisions than did the Court's own
statement of its doctrine. For Marshall, "A principled reading of what
this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards
in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.' 116 He concluded that: "This spectrum clearly comprehends
variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize
particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional
and societal importance of the interests adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classifica117
tion is drawn."
Justice Marshall compared his analysis to the Court's narrow
view of fundamental rights equal protection analysis. Justice Powell's
opinion for the majority limited application of the fundamental rights
doctrine to those rights explicitly or implicitly found in the Constitution. 1 18 Marshall made clear that his approach would afford at least
some degree of heightened protection to a broader range of interests.
The task in every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not
mentioned in the constitution. As the nexus between the specific
constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws
closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental
and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly. 119
Given the close relationship that he found between education and the
exercise of the right of free speech and the right to vote in federal
elections, Justice Marshall concluded that state classifications affecting
scrutinized with more
equality of educational opportunity should be 120
rigor than the majority's rational basis review.
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,121 Justice Marshall was the only dissenter from the Court's per curiam opinion upholding a law mandating retirement for uniformed state police officers
who reached age fifty. To Marshall, the Court's opinion finding that
114. 411 U.S. 1, 70-137 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's dissent
was joined by Justice Douglas.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 63-72.
116. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-99.

117. Id. at 99.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See supra text accompanying note 71.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 110-17.
427 U.S. 307, 317-27 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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age was not a suspect classification and so applying a deferential rational basis test exemplified the shortcomings of the traditional approach. Marshall understood that the extreme "all or nothing" nature
of the traditional test had made the Court wary of extending the list of
suspect classifications. Since very few, if any, statutes can withstand
strict scrutiny, by labelling a classification as "suspect" the Court
would virtually preclude any use of that criterion. 122 He noted, however, that in the area of gender and illegitimacy classifications the
Court had nevertheless applied "a reasonably probing look at the legislative goals and means, and at the significance of the personal rights
and interests invaded."' 123 The Court had done so, however, without
articulating a doctrine to account for its heightened scrutiny. In Justice Marshall's view, the Court's practice of deciding cases based on
factors outside the scope of its articulated doctrine created problems.
Government officials, lower court judges, and individuals were given
no notice as to applicable standards and were left to make ad hoc judgments of a classification's constitutionality. 124 Marshall also felt that
such an approach was unpredictable and "present[ed] the danger that
. . . relevant factors will be misapplied or ignored."' 2 5 Additionally,
Marshall observed in Rodriguez that: "Open debate of the bases for
the Court's action is essential to the rationality and consistency of our
decisionmaking process. Only in this way can we avoid the label of
legislature and ensure the integrity of the judicial process."1 26 Finally,
in setting forth his views, Justice Marshall has been careful to note
that he does not intend his doctrine to produce different results at
either the upper end of the scale where, for example, racial classifications are involved, 27 or at the bottom end where purely economic reg28
ulatory classifications are presented.
122. Id. at 319.
123. Id. at 320.

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 321.
Id.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 110.
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 319 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Some classifications are so invidious that they should be struck down
automatically absent the most compelling state interests, and by suggesting
the limitations of strict scrutiny analysis I do not mean to imply otherwise.
The analysis should be accomplished, however, not by stratified notions of
"suspect" classes and "fundamental" rights, but by individualized assessments of the particular classes and rights involved in each case. Of course,
the traditional suspect classes and fundamental rights would still rank at the
top of the list of protected categories, so that in cases involving those categories analysis would be functionally equivalent to strict scrutiny. Thus, the
advantages of the approach I favor do not appear in such cases, but rather
emerge in those dealing with traditionally less protected classes and rights.

(reference omitted).

128. See id.; Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 520.
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Justice Marshall has continued to articulate his sliding scale approach to equal protection analysis and to urge its adoption by the
Court. Although his view and similar views of others have garnered
some support among the other Justices, 129 Justice Marshall's approach
has not been explicitly adopted by the United States Supreme
Court. 130 The Alaska Supreme Court, however, with occasional refer-

ence to Justice Marshall,' 3 ' has adopted such a sliding scale approach
to equal protection analysis under the Alaska State Constitution. Let
us turn to a consideration of the development of the Alaska equal protection doctrine.

III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT EQUAL

PROTECTION STANDARD UNDER THE ALASKA
CONSTITUTION

A.

State and Federal Congruence: 1959 to 1976132

From statehood until the mid-1970's, the Alaska Supreme Court
consistently applied federal equal protection analysis and standards
when ruling on equal protection issues under the state's own constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Leege v. Martin1 33 was the
Alaska Supreme Court's first opinion relying on the equal protection
guarantee of article I, section 1 to strike down a state statute. In Leege
the court held unconstitutionally discriminatory a statutory provision
that prohibited the granting of a stay pending appeal of court orders
129. See supra note 78; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
130. But see City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3249.
131. See, e.g., State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 n.13 (Alaska 1983); see also
Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 14 nn.15 & 16 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring); State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125, 1127 n.12 (Alaska 1974); State v. Wylie, 516
P.2d 142, 150 n.16 (Alaska 1973).
132. Prior to Alaska's admission to statehood on January 3, 1959, the equal
protection standards applied in the Territory of Alaska were the same federal
standards that would have applied to any state within the union. The Organic Act of
the Territory included a uniformity clause which provided that "the constitution of
the United States and all the laws thereof which are not locally inapplicable, shall
have the same force and effect within the said territory as elsewhere in the United
States." Organic Act of the Territory of Alaska, ch. 387, 37 Stat. 512 (1912). In a
leading pre-statehood decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit said that whether the fourteenth amendment applied to Alaska for the same
reasons the fifth amendment did or whether it applied by virtue of the Organic Act,
"the tests and standards to be applied are the same." Alaska Steamship Co. v.
Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805, 817 (9th Cir. 1950). The court went on to state: "We
therefore approach the arguments made with respect to alleged inequality [and]
arbitrary classifications ... with the assumption that the validity of the Act must be
judged by the same standards of due process and of equal protection that would be
applied in the case of similar legislation by a state ....

133. 379 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1963).

"

Id. at 818.
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requiring forfeiture of commercial fishing licenses. The court equated
state and federal equal protection by saying that the state "constitutional guarantee of equal treatment, like the equal protection clause of
the federal constitution, is the embodiment of the fundamental principle that all men are equal before the law." 134 In Leege and in virtually
every other early equal protection case the Alaska Supreme Court illustrated its equal protection analysis by citing federal cases and ap135
plying federal equal protection standards.
The initial stages of the court's discomfort with the existing federal equal protection analysis can be seen in several opinions beginning
in 1973. In these cases the Alaska Supreme Court made clear, often in
footnotes, that it interpreted recent decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States as indicating a "discontent" with that Court's own
inflexible two-tier approach and cited with approval the now famous
analysis of that development published by Professor Gunther in
1972.136 At this point, however, the Alaska court did not formally
adopt an equal protection standard different from the two-tier approach nor did it attempt to separate its analysis under article I, section 1 of the state constitution from its interpretation of the federal
standard under the fourteenth amendment. A closer examination of
one of these opinions, Lynden Transport,Inc. v. State,137 is illustrative.
In Lynden Transport, the court, in an opinion by Justice
Boochever, upheld an equal protection challenge to a provision of the
Alaska Motor Freight Carrier Act 138 that required nonresident carriers to show public convenience and necessity to acquire intrastate operating authority even though those carriers already had interstate
operating authority, but "grandfathered" in resident carriers possessing interstate authority. In striking down this provision of the statute,
the court restated the general formulation of the two-tiered federal
standard.1 39 The court concluded that the classification was not based
134. Id. at 451-52, citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
135. Leege, 379 P.2d at 451-52. See also Hoffman v. State, 404 P.2d 644, 646

(Alaska 1965); In re Mackay, 416 P.2d 823, 851-52 (Alaska 1964); Nelson v. State,
387 P.2d 933, 935 (Alaska 1964).
136. Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 706 n.10 (Alaska 1975); State
v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125, 1127 n.12 (Alaska 1974); State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145
n.4 (Alaska 1973); see also Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1975). Each of
these opinions cites Gunther, Foreword: In Search ofEvolving Doctrineon a Changing
Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
137. 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975).

138. The challenged residency requirement is set forth in the court's opinion. Id.
at 703. The entire section as amended is contained in the appendix to the opinion. Id.
at 718-19.
139. A duality of standards has been evolved in determining violations of the
equal protection clause. If legislation interferes with a fundamental constitutional right or involves a suspect classification, it will be the subject of strict
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on a suspect criterion nor did it impinge on a fundamental right. 0
Nevertheless, the court found that no legitimate rational basis supported the legislation's discrimination against nonresident motor carriers.141 In reaching these conclusions the court made no effort to
establish an independent basis for its ruling under the state
constitution. 142
In Lynden Transport,the court did, however, indicate in a footnote that it was aware of criticism of the federal equal protection approach. The court stated:
It has been suggested that there is mounting discontent with the
rigid two-tier formulation of the equal protection doctrine, and that
the United States Supreme Court is prepared to use the clause more
rigorously to invalidate legislation without expansion of "fundamental rights" or "suspect" categories and the concomitant resort
to the "strict scrutiny" tests. We are in agreement with the view
that the Supreme Court's recent equal protection decisions have
shown a tendency towards less speculative, less deferential, more
traditional
intensified means-to-end inquiry when it is applying the143
rational basis test and we approve of this development.
Note that while the court approved of what it saw as a movement
toward federal change, it took no action to bring about that change
directly under the state constitution. For the time being the court was
willing to wait for federal developments in equal protection
analysis. 144

judicial scrutiny, and the burden is on the state to establish a compelling
state interest justifying the discrimination. Otherwise, the legislation will be
examined to determine whether it rationally furthers a legitimate state
purpose.
Id. at 706 (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 707.
141. Id. at 707-11.
142. The court said simply: "We conclude that the provision of the 1972 amendment limiting the grant of expanded routes according to residency violates the equal
protection clauses of the United States and Alaska constitutions." Id. at 711 (footnote
omitted). The opinion contains no separate discussion of the Alaska Constitution's
equal protection provision.
143. Id. at 706 n.10 (citing Gunther, supra note 136 (other citations omitted)).
144. The Alaska Court did not express the same reticence with regard to its view of
state independence in interpreting the state constitution's due process protection,
ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 7, as it had done with regard to equal protection. In Bush v.
Reid, 516 P.2d 1215, 1219-20 (Alaska 1973), the court seemed to go out of its way to
assert its independence:
We further declare that we would reach an identical result in interpreting

the due process provisions of the Alaska Constitution alone, finding as we do
that Justice Harlan's insightful analysis of the social compact applies with

equal force to our constitution. We have several times held that "we are
free, and we are under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and
privileges under our Alaska Constitution." Finding as we do that "civil
death" of parolees violates the spirit and intention of the Alaska Constitu-

ALASKA LAW REVIEW
B.

[Vol. 3:1

First Steps to Independence: Isakson v. Rickey

The Alaska Supreme Court began to establish its own independent equal protection test in Isakson v. Rickey. 145 In this opinion by
Justice Erwin, the court announced that it was applying a "new standard" which the court said would "close the wide gap between the two
tiers of equal protection by raising the level of the lower tier from
virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry." 146 The court also referred to this standard as a "modified rational basis test." 14 7
The court developed the test in the context of a challenge to one
provision in a legislative scheme to limit entry into the state's
threatened fisheries. 148 Efforts to protect Alaska's fisheries from
overuse and to do so in a way that both is fair to those who depend on
fishing for their livelihood and maintains the economic viability of the
industry have frequently come before the legislature and the courts.
The nature of the limited entry licensing scheme developed by the legislature and of court challenges to the limited entry program have
been discussed by others and need not be repeated here.149 Some detailed consideration must be given to the facts of Isakson, however, in
order to understand and evaluate the equal protection analysis employed by the state supreme court.
The Limited Entry Act provided that permits to enter the fishery
would be based on a ranking of the relative hardship caused by denial
of a permit examined in light of the applicants' prior involvement in
and dependence on fishing.1 50 Based on the experience of an earlier
attempt to limit entry, the legislature was aware that many persons
would seek to enter the fishery prior to the effective date of the legislation and be grandfathered in as eligible to apply for the new limited
entry permits.15 1 Even as it deliberated, the legislature was aware that
tion, we would not be impeded in our constitutional progress by a narrower
holding of the United States Supreme Court.
Id. (footnote omitted). Commentators have recognized the Alaska court's independence in due process analysis. Comment, An Application of the New Equal Protection:
Expansion of Convict PropertyRights, 4 UCLA-ALASKA L. Rnv. 294, 341 (1975); see
also Comment, Tarnef v. State: Miranda Is Alive and Well in Alaska, 4 UCLAALASKA L. Rnv. 92 (1974). But cf Concerned Citizens of South Kenai Peninsula v.
Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1974).
145. 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976).
146. Id. at 363.
147. Id,
148. ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.010-.270 (1973).
149. Groseclose & Boone, An Examination ofLimited Entry As a Method of Allocating Commercial Fishing Rights, 6 UCLA-ALASKA L. REv. 201 (1977); Owers,
Court Tests of Alaska's Limited Entry Law, 11 UCLA-ALASKA L. REv. 87 (1981).
150. Groseclose & Boone, supra note 149, at 208; Owers, supra note 149, at 88.
151. Owers, supra note 149, at 90-91.
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such a rush on gear licenses was already taking place. 152 The Limited
Entry Act took several steps to avoid the effects of this license rush.
The act provided that the date at which relative hardship would be
determined would be January 1, 1973, a date shortly before the rush to
obtain gear licenses began.15 3 In addition, the act provided that only
persons who had fished as holders of gear licenses before January 1,
1 54
1973, would be eligible for entry permits.
This limited entry scheme created two classifications that were
subsequently challenged. One was the distinction between those who
held or had held gear licenses and those who did not hold such
licenses. The other classification distinguished between those who obtained gear licenses before January 1, 1973, and those who obtained
gear licenses after that date but before the requirement for limited entry permits went into effect. Isakson involved a challenge to the second classification.1 55 Fishermen who had not possessed gear licenses
prior to the cutoff date but who had subsequently obtained them challenged the
state's refusal to accept their application for a limited entry
15 6
permit.
152. Id. at 91.
153. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.260(d) (1973).
154. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.260(a) (1973), as enacted and as considered in Isakson
provided:
The commission shall accept applications for entry permits only from applicants who have harvested fishery resources commercially while participating
in the fishery as holders of gear licenses issued under [ALASKA STAT.]
§ 16.05.536-16.05.670, before January 1, 1973.
1973 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 79, § 3. The section was subsequently amended. 1974
Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 126, § 3.
155. The Isakson opinion at times used very broad language that arguably applied
to both classifications. Although the State of Alaska interpreted Isakson as only holding unconstitutional the use of the classification between those who obtained gear
licenses before January 1, 1973, and those who obtained gear licenses after that date,
and not the limiting requirement of possession of such a license at any time, Owers,
supra note 149, at 97, this question was not finally resolved until the court held that
the narrow interpretation of Isakson was correct. Commercial Fisheries Entry
Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1259-61 (Alaska 1980). See Owers, supra note
149, at 97-102.
156. The court characterized the constitutional challenge in this manner:
Specifically, appellants argue that the legislature devised the January 1,
1973, cut-off date to facilitate the Commission's selection process by eliminating those applicants whom they believed would be unable to demonstrate
the hardship necessary for an entry permit. From this base they submit that
the January 1, 1973, date results in a classification which is overbroad and
underinclusive. Appellants point out that a person who has retired or discontinued commercial fishing prior to January 1, 1973, is allowed to apply
for a free permit regardless of the degree of hardship he would suffer by
being excluded from the fisheries simply by virtue of fortuitously holding a
gear license before the cut-off date. On the other hand, persons such as appellants, are precluded from even submitting an application because they
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Isakson acknowledged that "[i]n the past this court has applied
157 Still
the traditional tests in analyzing equal protection problems."
the court noted that its recent decisions had expressed "a growing dissatisfaction with the two-tiered test."' 5 s The court viewed the recent
decisions as having already "articulated a 'rational basis' test that was
more demanding than the standard used in previous cases."' 159 The
court quoted from its opinion in State v. Wylie:
Under the rational basis test, in order for a classification to survive
judicial scrutiny, the classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, 160
so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."'
This standard, which quotes the language of the United States
Supreme Court in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,1 6 1 had actually been
used in Wylie in conjunction with references to the Gunther article to
state the Alaska court's view of what it saw to be an evolving federal
standard.1 62 But Isakson states the test as an independent standard
adopted under the Alaska Constitution. This independence is clearly
indicated by the court's further characterization of the test:
It is this more flexible and more demanding standard which will be
applied in future cases if the compelling state interest test is found
inappropriate. As a result, we will no longer hypothesize facts
which would sustain otherwise questionable legislation as was the
case under the traditional rational basis standard . . . . This new
standard will, in short, close the wide gap between the two tiers of
equal protection by raising the level of163the lower tier from virtual
abdication to genuine judicial inquiry.
The court next stated how it would apply the "new" analysis.
First, the court must determine if the compelling state interest standard is applicable by examining the classification to see if it was based
64
on a suspect criterion or if it impinged upon a fundamental right.'
Since it found neither to be present in the case of the cutoff date for
became gear license holders after January 1, 1973. This is so despite the fact
that they have engaged in commercial fishing endeavors in previous years
and have invested large amounts of money in gear and vessels with the intention of fishing commercially for a living in the future. Thus, they submit, the
classification is unconstitutional.
Isakson, 550 P.2d at 361.
157. Id.
158. Id. The recent decisions discussed by the court are those cited supra note 136.
159. Isakson, 550 P.2d at 362.
160. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska

1973)).
161. 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
162. State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 n.4 (Alaska 1973); see also supra text accompanying notes 136-44.
163. Isakson, 550 P.2d at 362-63.
164. Id. at 363.
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eligibility to seek a limited entry permit, the court applied its new rational basis standard. 165 To do so, the court stated, "we must first
look at the purpose of the challenged legislation." 166 True to its word,
the court did so with new vigor.
Although the state argued that the purpose of the requirement
that applicants for a limited entry permit must have held a gear license
by January 1, 1973, was to prevent a rush on gear licenses, the court
rejected this as the purpose of the cutoff date. 167 Because another provision stated that the relevant degree of hardship would be determined
as of that date, the gear license rush would already be effectively deterred. 168 The court concluded that the legislature would not have
enacted two provisions with the same purpose in mind and that the
second provision must, therefore, have a different purpose.
When the Act is viewed as a whole, it becomes apparent that the
contested provision was inserted because it was assumed that those
persons who obtained gear licenses after January 1, 1973, would be
unable to demonstrate the requisite hardship for an entry permit.
Hence, for the sake of administrative convenience, it was decided
that they need not even submit applications to the Commission. In
essence, the purpose of the provision was to segregate hardship and
cases at the application phase of the permit issuance
non-hardship
69
process. 1
In light of this purpose, the court asserted that the issue it would have
to determine was: "does holding a gear license before January 1, 1973,
bear a fair and substantial relation to the purpose of the legislation,
which is the segregation of hardship and non-hardship cases?"' 170 The
court concluded that the cutoff date did not bear such a fair relationship but rather was both underinclusive and overinclusive. The classification was underinclusive because it excluded persons who were
highly dependent upon and actively involved in the fishery at the cutoff date but who had not then acquired a gear license.' 7 ' On the other
hand, the classification was overinclusive in that it allowed persons
who had received gear licenses in the past but were72no longer actively
engaged in the fishery to apply for entry permits.'
The court concluded that the statute's means were not sufficiently
related to its ends and so that portion of the Limited Entry Act setting
the cutoff date was a violation of equal protection principles. 17 3 The
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 363-65.
Id.at 364.
Id.
Id. at 365.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court had not established complete independence from federal standards, however, since it concluded its opinion by stating that the challenged section "violates appellants' equal protection rights guaranteed
1 74
by the state andfederal constitutions."
The Isakson opinion has been criticized both for the test that it
adopted and for its application of the test to the facts. One commentator, Mr. Owers, has summarized his views on Isakson in this way:
The Isakson court's more demanding standard relies, first upon a
mistaken reading of United States Supreme Court decisions applying a middle-level standard of scrutiny in areas involving individual
rights, and secondly, upon an expressly overruled line of cases. In
reality, the test is nothing more than the revival of old notions of
substantive due process under the rubric of equal protection. Nevertheless, later Alaska Supreme Court decisions have uncritically
followed Isakson's approach
to equal protection analysis despite its
dubious underpinnings. 175
Owers's first two criticisms are related to his conclusion that the
United States Supreme Court overruled Royster. 176 Owers asserts that
because the United States Supreme Court explicitly overruled its opinion in Morey v. Doud,177 which quoted the standard articulated in
Royster as its standard, Royster had itself been implicitly overruled.17 8
The United States Supreme Court's continued frequent citation of
Royster, however, clearly shows this assertion to be incorrect. 7 9 In
fact, a sharp debate continues on the United States Supreme Court,
particularly between Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, over whether
the Royster standard or a more deferential standard of rational basis
review is appropriate.180
Mr. Owers's criticism of Isakson as representing a revival of sub174. Id. at 366 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Alaska Supreme Court's
conclusion that the cutoff date violated fourteenth amendment equal protection standards was a mere proforma statement based upon no independent analysis of federal
cases. The conclusion was surely wrong in light of the United States Supreme Court's
subsequent opinion in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per
curiam), which upheld the use of a cutoff date for grandfathering in street vendors in
New Orleans. Dukes states a very deferential standard of rational basis review. Id. at
303-04.
175. Owers, supra note 149, at 95.
176. 253 U.S. 412 (1920) (applying a "fair or substantial relation" standard under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to strike down a Virginia
statute taxing out of state income of corporations doing business in Virginia, but exempting Virginia corporations).
177. 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled by, City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297 (1976).
178. Owers, supra note 149, at 94.
179. In Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374-75 (1974), for example, eight Justices joined in an opinion that explicitly applied the Royster standard.
180. GUNTHER & SCHAUER, supra note 19, at 159-60.
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stantive due process in the guise of equal protection raises an issue of
considerable difficulty. This criticism challenges the basic legitimacy
of such activist judicial review in a democratic society. If valid, such
criticism might apply with equal force to the fully developed equal
protection analysis now employed by the Supreme Court of Alaska
and to the analysis suggested by Justice Marshall. For this reason this
article will consider whether the Alaska equal protection analysis is
distinguishable from substantive due process after reviewing the full
181
development of the Alaska equal protection approach.
Although the Alaska Supreme Court identified the standard it announced in Isakson as a "new test," the standard is not new in its
formulation. Earlier Alaska cases had also repeated the Royster lan182
guage as the appropriate standard of review in rational basis cases.
But the Isakson opinion is "new" because it announces that Alaska
will use this formulation as its rational basis test independent of the
standard employed by the United States Supreme Court. Certainly,
the test was also new in the vigorous manner in which the court employed it to overturn a state legislative classification in an economic
and natural resources regulatory scheme. The Alaska Supreme
Court's independence soon made itself unmistakably clear when the
court adopted a truly new test to apply to all equal protection analysis
83
under the state constitution in State v. Erickson.1
C. True Independence: State v. Erickson
Although the Alaska Supreme Court applied its Isakson formulation of an equal protection standard in some cases,' 8 4 the court quickly
moved to establish a more complete independence from federal doctrine by announcing a single, uniform analysis to be applied in all cases
raising equal protection claims under article I, section 1, of the Alaska
Constitution. The court's action came in State v. Erickson,18 5 a case in
which criminal defendants challenged the constitutionality of Alaska's
statute classifying cocaine use as the use of a narcotic. The defendants
181. See infra Section IV.
182. E.g., State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1973).
183. 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
184. See, e.g., State v. Reefer King Co., 559 P.2d 56, 65 (Alaska 1976).
185. 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978). In addition to the equal protection issue discussed
infra, Erickson also addressed due process and privacy challenges to Alaska's prohibition of the possession or sale of cocaine. Cf Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska
1975) (upholding a privacy challenge to the criminalization of private possession and
use of marijuana). See Note, Alaska'sRight to Privacy Ten Years After Ravin v. State:
Developing a JurisprudenceofPrivacy, 2 ALASKA L. Rev. 159 (1985), for a discussion
of Ravin and the Alaska right to privacy.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1

were charged with the sale or possession of a narcotic drug, 86 since
cocaine was defined as a narcotic under the state statute.187 The defendants asserted that pharmacologically cocaine was not classified as
a narcotic and was more similar to amphetamines in its effects. 18 Because possession or sale of narcotics is punished more severely by the
state than the possession or sale of amphetamines, the defendants
alleged that the purported misclassification denied them equal
protection. 189
Justice Boochever, writing for the court, 190 began his equal protection analysis by reiterating that in prior cases the court had "expressed increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional two-tier test"
and had finally altered that test. 19 1 As the court stated: "Isakson
modified the test at the lower, non-fundamental right level by requiring a more exacting scrutiny."' 92 The opinion next addressed the full
spectrum of equal protection analysis and stated that it would use an
analysis independent of the federal analysis to the fullest extent possible. The court acknowledged that when fundamental rights or suspect
classifications as recognized by the United States Supreme Court were
involved, the Alaska court was required to apply the compelling state
interest test. 93 The court then declared its independence:
In applying the Alaska Constitution, however, there is no reason
why we cannot use a single test. Such a test will be flexible and
dependent upon the importance of the rights involved. Based on
the nature of the right, a greater or lesser burden will be placed on
the state to show that the classification has a fair and substantial
relation to a legitimate governmental objective. Where fundamental
rights or suspect categories are involved, the results of this test will
be essentially the same as requiring a "compelling state interest";
but, by avoiding outright categorization of fundamental and nonfundamental rights,
a more flexible, less result-oriented analysis
194
may be made.
In applying this approach, the court stated that it must first determine whether a fundamental right or suspect classification was involved that would require application of the federal compelling state
186. Erickson, 574 P.2d at 3. The offense was defined in ALASKA STAT.
§ 17.10.010 (1962) (repealed 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 45, § 26).
187. ALASKA STAT. § 17.10.230 (13) (Supp. 1970) (repealed 1982 Alaska Sess.
Laws ch. 45, § 26), quoted in Erickson, 574 P.2d at 3 n.7.
188. Erickson, 574 P.2d at 10.
189. Id. at 11.
190. Justices Rabinowitz, Connor, and Burke joined in the opinion. Justice Matthews concurred in an opinion that questioned the propriety of the privacy test employed by the court but did not mention the equal protection analysis. Id. at 23-24.

191. It at 11.
192. Id
193. Id; see infra text accompanying notes 216-19.
194. 574 P.2d at 11-12 (footnote omitted) (citing Gunther, supra note 136).
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interest test. It concluded that neither was present in Erikson and that
it was therefore free to apply the state constitutional test of equal protection. 195 The court outlined the procedures to be followed in applying the new test:
Initially, we must look to the purpose of the statute, viewing the
legislation as a whole, and the circumstances surrounding it. It
must be determined that this purpose is legitimate, that it falls
within the police power of the state. Examining the means used to
accomplish the legislative objectives and the reasons advanced
therefore, the court must then determine whether the means chosen
substantially further the goals of the enactment. Finally, the state
the nature of
interest in the chosen means must 9be
6 balanced against
the constitutional right involved.'
Applying the test to the facts, the court concluded that the legislature
specifically had intended to regulate cocaine as a drug that was potentially harmful to the health and welfare of society and to penalize its
possession and use in a manner similar to the legislature's treatment of
the possession and use of opiates. The court concluded, contrary to
the defendants' assertion, that the legislature did not intend only to
proscribe those drugs that were pharmacologically similar to opium in
their effect. "We conclude that the legislature intended to regulate
drugs that adversely affect the health and welfare of society. Only if
cocaine is not harmful to health and welfare of society to any substantial degree, could we hold this purpose to be invalid." 197 After reviewing evidence of cocaine's harmfulness and potential harmfulness, the
court concluded that the penalties placed on the drug's use were substantially related to achieving the legislature's purpose.1 98 On the basis of this analysis, the court rejected the equal protection claim.
In concluding its equal protection consideration in this manner,
the court did not expressly engage in the final balancing that seemed
required by the procedure the court had outlined for applying its new
test. In defining those procedures, the court stated: "Finally, the state
interest in the chosen means must be balanced against the nature of
the constitutional right involved."1 99 This statement suggested that
the evaluation and balancing of the interest asserted by the individual
challenging the state's classification was the last step in the equal protection analysis. Earlier in the Erickson opinion, however, the court
stated with regard to its new approach: "Based on the nature of the
right, a greater or lesser burden will be placed on the state to show
that the classification has a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

12.
16.
16-18.
12.
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governmental objective. ' ' 200 This statement suggested that the interest
asserted by the individual would be evaluated in an initial balancing
that would establish the degree of justification to be required of the
state. In Erickson, the court apparently utilized the second approach.
The ambiguity as to when the balancing of interests was to occur remained, however, until clarified by recent opinions of the court that
are discussed in the next section.
D.

Refining the Alaska Test: State v. Ostrosky and Alaska Pacific
Assurance Co. v. Brown

Application of the Erickson equal protection test in subsequent
cases has not always followed a level road. In fact, in one instance,
Justice Rabinowitz noted in dissent "the court's apparent sub silentio
interment of the balancing element of Alaska's equal protection
test." 20 1 In retrospect, the Justice's alarm appears to be overdrawn
because, in general, the cases following Erickson may be characterized
as attempting to apply its approach. Nevertheless, the question of
when to balance the individual's interest versus that of the state, at the
beginning or at the end of the Alaska analysis, remained muddled.
20 2
The court directly addressed this issue in State v. Ostrosky.
This case considered a number of challenges to the restrictions of the
Limited Entry Act and to those provisions of the act that permitted
the transfer of entry permits by sale or inheritance. 20 3 In considering
the equal protection challenges raised in Ostrosky, Justice Matthews's
opinion first outlined the standards of review under the United States
Constitution 2° 4 but quickly turned to a comparison of the review
under Alaska's own state standards.
The approach we have taken under the state equal protection clause
is somewhat different. In contrast to the rigid tiers of federal equal
protection analysis, we have postulated a single sliding scale of review ranging from relaxed scrutiny to strict scrutiny. The applicable standard of review for a given case is to be determined by the
200. Id.
201. Rose v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n., 647 P.2d 154, 165 n.6 (Alaska
1982) (Rabinowitz, C. J., dissenting).
202. 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983). Justice Rabinowitz dissented in Ostrosky, id. at
1195-98, but did not question the majority's formulation of the equal protection analysis. Justice Rabinowitz adopted and further clarified the Ostrosky approach in his
majority opinion in Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269-70
(Alaska 1984).
203. 667 P.2d at 1185. The Limited Entry Act is described supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
204. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1192. The Alaska court expanded its description of the
federal approach from two tiers to three by inclusion of the intermediate level of review. Id. The intermediate level of review was described earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 84-91.
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importance of the individual rights asserted and by the degree of
suspicion with which we view the resulting classification scheme.
As legislation burdens more fundamental rights, such as rights to
speak and travel freely, it is subjected to more rigorous scrutiny at a
more elevated position on our sliding scale. Likewise, laws which
embody classification schemes that are more constitutionally suspect, such as laws discriminating
against racial or ethnic minorities,
20 5
are more strictly scrutinized.
The court indicated that this was the approach previously articulated in State v. Erickson and quoted that part of Erickson which indi-

cated that balancing the individual's interest against the state's interest

20 6
was inherent in the first step of the Alaska equal protection analysis.

The court then continued its analysis:
Having selected a standard of review on the Erickson sliding scale,
we then apply it to the challenged legislation. This is done by scrutinizing the importance of the governmental interests which it is asserted that the legislation is designed to serve and the closeness of
the means-to-ends fit between the legislation and those interests. As
the level of scrutiny selected is higher on the Erickson scale, we
require that the asserted governmental interests be relatively more
compelling and that the legislation's means-to-ends fit be correspondingly closer. On the other hand, if relaxed scrutiny is indicated, less important governmental objectives will suffice and a
greater degree of over/or underinclusiveness in the means-to-ends
fit will be tolerated. . . . As a minimum, we require that the legislation be based on a legitimate public purpose and that the classification "be reasonable, not arbitrary, and . .. rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation .... -207

If any question remained as to when the court would balance the
individual's interest against the state's interest, it was removed by the
court's discussion of this issue in a footnote. The court stated:
Other language in Erickson suggests that a balancing of the individual rights asserted against the state's objective is to take place as a
process separate from the identification and application of the appropriate standard of review. . . . Such a process is neither useful
nor necessary because the selection of the standard of review on the
sliding scale reflects an assessment of the importance of the individual rights, and the standard when selected posits the degree of importance which the government objective must have and the
required closeness of fit between the means used to achieve that ob205. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1192-93 (Footnote 13 is omitted but is discussed individually in the text. See izfra text accompanying note 209.).
206. Id. at 1193 (quoting State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Alaska 1978)). That
portion of Erickson quoted by the court in Ostrosky is set out in the text. See supra
text accompanying note 194.
207. Id. (citations omitted) (Footnote 14 is omitted but is discussed individually in
the text. See infra text accompanying note 208).
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jective and its achievement. Thus, balancing is inherent in the process of selection and application
of the standard of review and is not
20 8
itself a separate step.
Thus, Ostrosky makes clear that the weight of the interest asserted by
the individual is to be considered initially in determining what level of
review is to be applied.
Another footnote in Ostrosky is also of particular interest because
in it the court explicitly recognized the similarity of the approach it
had adopted to the analysis put forward by Justice Marshall and
others on the United States Supreme Court. The Alaska court stated
in part that "[t]he flexible scale we use resembles the 'spectrum of
standards' of which Justices Marshall and White have written with
respect to federal equal protection. '209 Surprisingly, this recognition
is one of the few times that the court makes any mention of Justice
Marshall's suggested federal approach.
In Alaska PacificAssurance Co. v. Brown, 210 Justice Rabinowitz, a
dissenter in Ostrosky, wrote an opinion strongly endorsing the Ostrosky formulation of the Alaska equal protection analysis. Justice
Rabinowitz carefully pointed out the shift that had occurred from Erickson to Ostrosky. He noted that Erickson required the court first to
assess "the state purposes behind challenged legislation," second to
evaluate "the relationship between the chosen means and the asserted
goals of the statute," and third to weigh "the state's interest in the
means chosen as balanced against the nature of the constitutional right
infringed. '2 11 However, Justice Rabinowitz observed, Ostrosky "formally revised the order of the analytical stages of Erickson."21 2 Under
the new order of analysis:
First, it must be determined at the outset what weight should be
afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged enactment. The nature of this interest is the most important variable
in fixing the appropriate level of review. Thus, the initial inquiry
under article I, section 1 of Alaska's constitution goes to the level of
scrutiny. .

.

. Depending upon the primacy of the interest in-

volved, the state will have a greater or lesser burden in justifying its
legislation.
Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes
served by a challenged statute. Depending on the level of review
determined, the state may be required to show only that its objectives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum, or, at the
high end of the scale, that the legislation was motivated by a compelling state interest.
208. Id. at 1193 n.14 (citation omitted).
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 1193 n.13.
687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984).
Id. at 269.
Id.
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Third, an evaluation of the state's interest in the particular
means employed to further its goals must be undertaken. Once
again, the state's burden will differ in accordance with the determination of the level of scrutiny under the first stage of analysis. At
the low end of the sliding scale, we have held that a substantial
relationship between means and ends is constitutionally adequate.
At the higher end of the scale, the fit between means and ends must
be much closer. If the purpose can be accomplished by2a13 less restrictive alternative, the classification will be invalidated.
Cases such as Ostrosky and Brown clearly show that the Supreme
Court of Alaska has taken great care to articulate and refine an independent state constitutional analysis for equal protection claims.
While the supreme courts of some states have moved to constitutional
independence largely in reaction to particular results in United States
2 14
the
Supreme Court decisions, a process that has been criticized,
Alaska court has developed an independent doctrine in response to the
confusion and inconsistency that characterizes recent United States
equal protection analysis. It remains for us to give some evaluation of
the doctrine that the Alaska Supreme Court has produced.
IV.
A.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON ALASKA EQUAL
PROTECTION DOCTRINE

Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Alaska is free to interpret and enforce the provisions of its constitution as it sees fit so long as it does not contravene the requirements
of federal law or the United States Constitution. Under the
supremacy clause 2 15 the state may not enforce a lower level of equal
protection than that established by the United States Supreme Court.
This principle is well recognized by the Alaska court 21 6 even if, on
occasion, the court has incorrectly judged the standards of the federal
Supreme Court. 217 Still, the Alaska court is free to interpret the language of its constitution differently than the United States Supreme
Court would interpret comparable language in the federal Constitution. 2 18 The United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized
213. Id. at 269-70.
214. See, eg., Collins, supra note 6.
215. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
216. E.g., Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 422, 427 (Alaska 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978).
217. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
218. See, eg., Robison v. Francis, No. 3011, slip op. at 30-31 (Alaska Jan. 17,
1986). In Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972), the court expressly noted its
independence:
While some of the terms of article I, section 1 parallel the language of
various federal constitutional provisions, we have repeatedly held that this
court is not obliged to interpret our constitution in the same manner as the
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that "[a] state court may, of course, apply a more stringent standard of
review as a matter of state law under the State's equivalent to the
Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. ' 219 In addition, in some
cases in which the Supreme Court has concluded that a state court
improperly applied federal equal protection standards under the fourteenth amendment, some Justices have expressly indicated that the
state could reach the questioned result if it so desired under the state
220
constitution.
Furthermore, under the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of its exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the Court will not review
state court rulings on state law even though the Supreme Court properly has the case before it on issues of federal law. 221 In addition,
under the doctrine of the independent and adequate state ground, the
Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to review a state court decision
even when a federal issue may be erroneously decided if a separate
state ground of decision would nevertheless lead to the same outcome. 222 As Justice Jackson stated:
Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is
to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment
would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of
federal laws, our
review could amount to nothing more than an ad223
visory opinion.
The present status of the independent and adequate state ground
doctrine is controversial, however. In the face of increased state court
activism the Supreme Court has tightened the requirements of the
doctrine. While in the past the Court might strain to find that a decision was based on an independent state ground so as to avoid addressing an issue of federal law, the Burger Court, particularly in cases
Supreme Court of the United States has construed parallel provisions of the
federal Constitution.
Id at 167 (footnotes omitted) (state due process afforded student liberty to choose
their hair length). See generally Brennan, supra note 6, at 498-502. For an extensive
examination of the Alaska Supreme Court's independence in interpreting the state
constitutional provisions affecting criminal procedure see Galie, State Constitutional
Guaranteesand the Alaska Supreme Court: CriminalProcedure Rights and the New
Federalism, 1960-1981, 18 GONZ. L. Rnv. 221 (1983) [hereinafter cited as State
Guarantees].

219. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981).

220. See, e.g., Idaho Dep't of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 103 (1977) (per
curiam) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part, joined by Marshall, J.)
221. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 636 (1875).
222. See, ag., Brennan, supra note 6, at 501; Welch, Whose Federalism?- The
Burger Court's Treatment ofState Civil Liberties Judgments, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.
Q. 819, 833-34 (1983).
223. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
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involving issues of criminal procedure, has held that if the ground of
decision is unclear, the Court will presume that it is dependent on the
federal ground. 224 The Court did state, however, that, "[i]f the state
court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively
based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we,
of course, will not undertake to review the decision. '22 5 Some critics
see the Court's new requirement of a clear statement as a threat to
federalism and as a reflection of the Burger Court's desire to stifle state
opinions going beyond the Court's own views. 226 Other commentators
see the Court's policy of assuming that ambiguous decisions are based
on federal law in the absence of a clear statement as a reasonable compromise between state autonomy and federal supremacy.2 27 Whatever
one's view of the Burger Court's gloss on the independent and adequate state ground rule, a careful state court guided by effective counsel can ensure the independence of its decisions based on state law.228
The Supreme Court of Alaska, with its long tradition of independent reliance on the state constitution, 22 9 should readily be able
to satisfy the Burger Court's requirement of an articulated statement
of its independent state grounds. Satisfying the requirement should be
particularly easy for the Alaska court to accomplish in equal protec-

tion cases because it has adopted a policy of addressing the state constitutional issue first. Justice Dimond's majority opinion in Williams

v. Zobel provides an example: "Because the tax statute is violative of
the Alaska Constitution, we do not reach the question of whether it
224. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983).
225. Id. at 1041.
226. See, e.g., Collins, Plain Statements: Supreme Court's New Requirement, 70
A.B.A. J. 92 (March 1984); Welch, Reconsidering the ConstitutionalRelationship Between State and Federal Courts: A Critique of Michigan v. Long, 59 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 1118 (1984); Welch, supra note 222.
227. See, e.g., Schlueter, Federalismand Supreme Court Review ofExpansive State
Court Decisions: A Response to UnfortunateImpressions, 11 HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q.
523 (1984); Schlueter, JudicialFederalismand Supreme Court Review of State Court
Decisions: A Sensible Balance Emerges, 59 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1079 (1984).
228. One commentator has suggested, "[The wisest course is for lawyers to separate all state law arguments from federal ones and request the reviewing court to do
likewise." Collins, supra note 226, at 93. Justice Hans Linde, writing for the Supreme
Court of Oregon in a case on remand from the United States Supreme Court, has
issued a generic statement of independence:
Lest there be any doubt about it, when this court cites federal opinions in
interpreting a provision of Oregon Law, it does so because it finds the views
there expressed persuasive, not because it considers itself bound to do so by
its understanding of federal doctrines.
State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 267, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983). See E Pluribus,supra
note 6, at 173-79.
229. Alaska from its inception as a state has taken its constitution seriously
and adopted an activist and innovative stance in interpreting its provisions.
State Guarantees,supra note 218, at 261.
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violates the federal constitution. ' 23 0 In addition, the Alaska Supreme
Court has indicated that it will apply only its own heightened rational
basis analysis, and will not apply the federal analysis, in cases where
there is no allegation that a fundamental right or suspect class is involved. For, as the court stated, "[S]ince the intensified rational basis
test adopted in Alaska subjects legislative classifications to greater
scrutiny than the federal rational basis test, we think it appropriate to
limit our discussion to whether the challenged regulations satisfy the
state equal protection standard. ' 23 1 The approach of addressing state
claims first and foregoing consideration of federal claims when the ruling on the state claim is in favor of the appellant has long been advocated by Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court.232 This
technique effectively avoids any difficulty with the United States
Supreme Court's heightened independent and adequate state grounds
requirement.
B.

Alaska's Approach Compared to the Federal Approaches

1. Substantive Due Process. The foregoing discussion indicates
that the Alaska Supreme Court is fully authorized under our federal
system to pursue an independent equal protection analysis under the
state constitution and that, with careful draftsmanship, the state court
should have little difficulty protecting its state grounds from interference by a less activist United States Supreme Court. The most important question, however, remains to be answered: Is the Alaska sliding
scale equal protection analysis an appropriate judicial doctrine?
Although the balancing of individual interest versus state interest that
is at the core of the analysis inevitably subjects the court to the charge
that it is substituting its views for those of the legislature, the sliding
scale approach is an effective doctrine and is preferable to the present
doctrinal disarray of the United States Supreme Court. So long as the
Alaska Supreme Court does not apply an overly strict level of review
230. 619 P.2d 422, 429 (Alaska 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
But cf Schafer v. Vest, 680 P.2d 1169, 1171 n.9 (Alaska 1984) (the court first held
that the state's longevity Bonus Program was unconstitutional under the United States
Constitution and thus found it unnecessary to consider whether the program violated
the Alaska Constitution); Robison v. Francis, No. 3011, slip op. at 28-29 (Alaska Jan.
17, 1986) (the court first held that the Alaska Local Hire statute violated the privileges
and immunities clause of the United States constitution and thus found it unnecessary
to consider whether it also violated the equal protection clause of the Alaska
Constitution).
231. Rose v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 647 P.2d 154, 158 (Alaska
1982) (citation omitted); accord Anchorage Educ. Ass'n v. Anchorage School Dist.,
648 P.2d 993, 996-97 n.7 (Alaska 1982).
232. Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981) (Linde, J.); First
Things First, supra note 6; Linde, Without "Due Process" UnconstitutionalLaw in
Oregon, 49 OR. L. Rnv. 125 (1970).
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to economic regulatory legislation at the bottom end of its sliding scale
and carefully articulates the factors and their weights that lead it to
adopt a particular level of scrutiny, the Alaska approach may be distinguished from a pure exercise of substantive due process.
As the previous consideration of Isakson v. Rickey 2 33 makes
clear, from the beginning of the Alaska Supreme Court's development
of its own equal protection analysis the court has insisted on applying
a more demanding review of social and economic legislation than the
extremely deferential test applied by the United States Supreme
Court.2 34 In Isakson the court rejected as the actual purpose of a chal-

lenged classification a purpose that was plausible in light of the legislative history and the wording of the statute and one that was strongly
asserted by the state.2 3 5 The court found that that purpose was already served by other provisions of the statute and posited for itself
the purpose of the classification. 236 Viewed most critically, the Isakson court rejected the asserted purpose and chose its own "real" purpose for the classification as a straw man and then quickly concluded
that the classification did not have a "fair and substantial relation" to
that real purpose. To a judicial realist, Isakson would be a fine exam237
ple of a court shaping its analysis to reach a predetermined result.
The decision has been criticized as a revival of economic substantive
due process in which the court has merely substituted its view of ap23 8
propriate policy for that of the legislature.
Criticism of the Isakson opinion is appropriate. Alaska, of
course, could utilize an analytical system that includes economic substantive due process in interpreting its constitution. Some states continue to do so. 2 39 But such a course by the Alaska court would be illadvised and might seriously threaten support for the court. If the
court had continued to second-guess plausible legislative purposes in
233. 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976) (discussed supra section III. B).
234. The Alaska Supreme Court continues to apply the heightened rational basis
standard. E.g., State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983); see supra text accompanying note 207.
235. 550 P.2d at 363-65; see supra text accompanying notes 167-68; Owers, supra
note 149, at 90-91, 95-97.
236. 550 P.2d at 364-65; see supra text accompanying note 169.
237. See generally Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82
YALE L.J. 123 (1972).

238. Owers, supra note 149, at 95. See generally Howard, supra note 6, at 879-91
(application of a "real and substantial relation" test may result in a "substantially
stricter review of economic regulations than the federal courts are willing to pursue");
Linde, Due Process of Law Making, 55 NEB. L. Rnv. 197 (1976).
239. Howard, supra note 6, at 879-91. Older studies on state use of economic substantive due process include Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive
Due Processof Law, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 226 (1958); Paulson, The Persistenceof Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91 (1950).
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applying its sliding scale equal protection analysis to economic regulations, it would have undermined any effort to legitimize its analysis as
equal protection doctrine rather than as merely due process wrapped
in equal protection terminology. Fortunately, the court has moved
away from such hyperactivity at the bottom end of its sliding scale.
Two of the cases that illustrate this movement involved, as Isakson
did, challenges to provisions of the Limited Entry Act. In Commercial FisheriesEntry Commission v. Apokedak 240 the court resolved an
ambiguity in its Isakson decision 24 1 and upheld the Act's basic requirement that limited those who could apply for entry permits to persons
who had held gear permits at some time in the past. 242 In doing so,
the court did not insist on determining "the purpose" of the particular
challenged provision as it had done in Isakson. Rather, the court recognized that, "[s]eldom, if ever, will a statutory scheme, especially one
as complicated as the Limited Entry Act, have a single monolithic
in
purpose. The legislature usually acts with a variety of purposes '243
mind and each of these purposes deserves judicial recognition.
The court then continued in a footnote:
This is not to say that the judiciary is required to hypothesize
or invent purposes, something Isakson's intensified scrutiny test specifically rejects. Close examination of the statutory scheme will usually yield several concrete legislative purposes having a substantial
basis in reality, even if these purposes
are not specifically identified
244
in a statutory purpose clause.
245
The court found four "broad purposes" behind the legislation.
Concluding that the gear license requirement bore a fair and substantial relationship to at least one of these purposes, the court held that
the classification did not violate the state equal protection guarantee. 246 The court noted that in individual cases the classification might
produce extreme hardship and that the legislature might have done
better in producing regulation more neatly designed to accomplish its
purpose. "But equal protection, even under Alaska's stricter standard,
does not demand perfection in classification. If it did, there would be
few laws establishing classifications that would sustain an equal protection challenge. '247 The Alaska Supreme Court has demonstrated
in subsequent cases such as Rose v. CommercialFisheriesEntry Com240. 606 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1980).
241. See supra note 155.
242. 606 P.2d at 1263-64. For a discussion of the facts surrounding Apokedak and
its holding, see Owers, supra note 149, at 98-102.
243. 606 P.2d at 1264 (omitted footnote set forth infra text accompanying note

244).
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at

1264-65 n.39.
1265.
1266-68.
1267 (footnote omitted).
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mission 248 and Anchorage Education Association v. Anchorage School
District249 that the respect shown in Apokedak for legislative decisions
made in economic regulatory classifications will now be the rule and
the inquiry in Isakson the exception.
Even if the Alaska Supreme Court avoids merely substituting its
judgment for that of the legislature when evaluating economic regulations, is the state equal protection analysis really nothing more than a
variation of the United States Supreme Court's fundamental rights
equal protection analysis? Can the Alaska equal protection analysis be
distinguished from substantive due process? After all, under the
Alaska doctrine, the court looks at the interest identified by the party
as affected by the challenged classification and assigns to that interest
some degree of importance or weight. Under the doctrine the court
may give great weight to an interest that is neither directly expressed
nor closely related to an interest expressed in the state constitution.
2. Fundamental Rights Equal Protection Analysis. The United
States Supreme Court's fundamental rights equal protection analysis
supplies a useful comparison with the Alaska analysis. Under that
doctrine the Court applies "strict scrutiny" and requires a "compelling" state interest in order to justify a classification that burdens a
"fundamental right." The doctrine has been roundly criticized both
on the Court and by commentators who question the Court's basis for
finding a right to be fundamental, 250 and insist that if the right is fundamental under the Constitution, it should be afforded protection directly. 25 1 While the development of this doctrine is understandable
historically,2 52 the critics are quite correct in questioning its present
acceptability. In its essence, the fundamental rights
equal protection
2 53
doctrine is an exercise of substantive due process.
248. 647 P.2d 154, 159-60 (Alaska 1982).
The allocation of a limited economic resource - here, a limited entry
permit - necessarily requires the creation of a system of classification ....
While this court subjects any such classification to scrutiny to assure that the
system is consistent with the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution, we remain mindful that the legislature enjoys broad discretion when
distributing scarce economic benefits. To require a reasonable nexus between legislative means and ends is not to demand perfection in

Id.

classification.
249. 648 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1982). For a discussion of the opinions in Anchorage
Education Ass'n, see Note, The Alaska Supreme Court and the Rights of Public School
Teachersas Employees: A Suggested Response to JudicialLimitation of Collective Bargaining Rights, 1 ALAsICA L. Rlv. 79 (1984).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 54 and 71-73.
251. See supra text accompanying note 53; Perry, supra note 103, at 1075.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
253. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 103; Comment, Equal Protectionand Due Process:
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The Alaska sliding scale analysis and Supreme Court Justice
Marshall's approach are sufficiently different from substantive due
process to escape much of this criticism. The federal fundamental
rights equal protection analysis has a rigid all-or-nothing quality.
Once a fundamental right is found to be affected, the doctrine requires
the state to bear the enormous burden of showing a compelling interest for the use of the classification. By contrast, the Alaska approach
has none of this rigid quality. Its focus is on the state's justification for
its differential treatment of the individual making the equal protection
claim. The analysis is not concerned with whether or not the individual's interest is fundamental. It is concerned only with determining
whether the state's treatment of some persons differently from other
persons is justified. In making that determination, the court evaluates
the importance of the individual's interest, but it does so only for the
purpose of determining the appropriate degree of justification the state
must possess to validate the classification. In applying the sliding
scale analysis, the weight judicially accorded the individual's interest
exists only within the parameters of that analysis. Outside of those
confines it has no "substance." This method is in sharp contrast to the
federal doctrine where presumably once an interest has been held to be
"fundamental" it would be so for all constitutional purposes and its
"substance" would be protected as a due process liberty.2 54 This fear
of creating new protected rights has been a strong constraint on the
expansion of the federal review doctrine. Because the Alaska analysis
affords a weight to the interest only for the purpose of evaluating the
particular equal protection claim, the state court need not feel so con255
strained to limit its judicial scrutiny.
Although the Alaska approach to equal protection analysis is distinguishable from substantive due process, it does involve an explicit
judicial balancing of interests. Balancing approaches in constitutional
adjudication have been criticized as inappropriate by several commenContrastingMethods of Review Under Fourteenth Amendment Doctrine, 14 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 529, 537-41 (1979). See also Perry, supra note 103, at 1074-83.
254. Perry, supra note 103, at 1075.
255. In a famous concurrence, arguing that equal protection should be a preferred
ground of decision, Mr. Justice Jackson stated:
The burden should rest heavily upon one who would persuade us to use
the due process clause to strike down a substantive law or ordinance ...
Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due process grounds leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable.
Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, does not
disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It
merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader impact.
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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tators. 256 Critics assert that balancing tests permit judges to make essentially ad hoc decisions based on their own value judgments: the
way in which the judge defines the interests involved and the weights
he or she assigns to them predetermine the results. Then, as one critic
suggests, "As soon as he finishes measuring the unmeasureable, the
'257
judge's next job is to compare the incomparable.
Other commentators have supported balancing approaches and
recommended balancing models for equal protection analysis. 25 8 Supporters of balancing believe that the approach requires judges to
openly state and evaluate the factors that lead them to their decisions.
The rationale of the decision, thus exposed, is then fully open for rational criticism. The comments of one supporter of balancing in the
first amendment context are also applicable to equal protection
balancing:
Open balancing compels a judge to take full responsibility for his
decisions, and promises a particularized, rational account of how he
arrives at them - more particularized and more rational at least
than the familiar parade of hallowed abstractions, elastic absolutes,
and selective history. Moreover, this approach should make it more
difficult for judges to rest on their predispositions without ever subjecting them to the test of reason.
2 59 It should also make their accounts more rationally auditable.
These observations have special weight in light of developments
on the federal level where, as we have seen, the Court has insisted on a
formal doctrine of rigid tiers, yet has rendered many opinions that
hardly seem consistent with that doctrine. The Alaska Supreme Court
has developed its sliding scale analysis in large part in response to this
confusion. To the extent that the Alaska court applies its sliding scale
test in a principled manner, its opinions will display clearly the balance the court has struck in determining the level of review to apply to
a classification and will identify each specific factor that led to that
result. 260 The real advantage of the Alaska sliding scale approach will
256. E.g., Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962);
see Barrett, supra note 103, at 126-27, 129; E Pluribus,supra note 6, at 186-87 (state
constitutional law need not follow federal doctrines, if one is able to persuade the state
court of something better); Comment supra note 253, at 545-47 (criticism of Justice
Marshall's proposed equal protection balancing).
257. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law? - A Reply to ProfessorMendelson, 51
CALIF. L. REv. 729, 748 (1963).
258. See authorities cited supra note 106; Perry, Constitutional "Fairness" Notes
On EqualProtection and Due Process, 63 VA. L. REv. 383 (1977); Comment, Fundamental PersonalRights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. CH. L. REV.

807 (1973).
259. Mendelson, On the Meaning of the FirstAmendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 825-26 (1962).
260. Professor Gunther has identified "the single most important trait in a Justice
committed to the balancing approach: a capacity to identify and evaluate separately
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be in the middle range of interests between those interests to which the
federal doctrine has applied only a rational basis review and those to

which it has applied strict scrutiny. 261 This is the area where federal

cases have been most inconsistent and where Justice Marshall and advocates of equal protection balancing have suggested that adoption of
a sliding scale approach would have its greatest effect. 262 Opinions of

the court suggest
the Alaska Supreme Court agrees with this
2 63
observation.
C.

A Final Defense of Alaska's Independent Approach

Each of the issues considered in appraising the Alaska equal protection doctrine - its relation to due process and the propriety of its
balancing - are in a sense expressions of a more basic issue concerning the legitimacy of the Alaska Supreme Court's active judicial review. The legitimacy of judicial review on the federal level is an issue
that has long preoccupied constitutional scholars and its consideration
is beyond this endeavor. 264 Recently, however, commentators have
begun to consider the special factors, factors perhaps unique to a particular state, that may inform and support the role of judicial review in
state courts.2 65 These factors include the text, history, doctrine, and
structure of the Constitution and the particular social or moral values
266
of the state.

In considering equal protection under the state constitution, the
each analytically distinct ingredient of the contending interests." Gunther, In Search
of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L.
REv. 1001, 1035 (1972).
261. At least one writer has expressed the fear that the use of balancing in equal
protection analysis might produce a diminution of protection against racial or national
origin discrimination. Comment, supra note 253, at 532. This fear would appear to be
unfounded for Alaska. First, if the federal Court continues to apply strict scrutiny to
such classifications, the supremacy clause will require invalidation of such classifications even in the unlikely event the Alaska court sought to strike a balance at some
lower level of review. Second, unlike the federal Constitution, the Alaska charter has
an explicit prohibition against the denial of any civil or political right because of race,
color, creed, sex, or national origin. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3. This express protection should afford a continued guarantee against discrimination.
262. Wilkinson, supra note 103, at 989-98; Note, supra note 106, at 1391-97.
263. See, e.g., State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Alaska 1978).
264. See, eg., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
265. E Pluribus,supra note 6, is particularly useful since the author explores the
relationship between constitutional theories and state courts. See Howard, supra note
6; Galie, supra note 6.
266. E Pluribus,supra note 6, at 179-93; Howard, supra note 6, at 934-44; Williams, supra note 6, at 397-402.
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Alaska Supreme Court has been preoccupied with doctrine, as has this
commentary. The preoccupation is understandable given the absence
of coherent federal doctrine. Yet it is the content of the equality that
is protected that ultimately determines the legitimacy of the review.
In defining that content, the Alaska court has many factors on which
to draw. In asserting its independence in other constitutional contexts, the court has, for example, protected a male student's right to
wear long hair in light of the state's particular traditional concern for
the "preservation of maximum individual choice, protection of minority sentiments, and appreciation for divergent lifestyles. '267 The court
has also found that the requirement of selecting jurors from within a
fifteen-mile radius of trial violated state constitutional guarantees of a
fair and impartial jury in light of the juxtaposition of widely scattered
native villages and concentrated white urban areas in the state. 268 The
history and character of Alaska have also been important in the state's
independent interpretation of equal protection. For example, the
Alaska court has continued to apply a stringent protection of the right
to travel or the right to interstate migration under the state constitution in spite of a softening of federal concern for classifications creating durational residency requirements. 269 At least one justice has
explained that "[t]he uniquely important status of right-to-travel protection in the Alaska Constitution reflects, in part, an awareness of the
distinctive character of this state in attracting many new residents to
participate in Alaska's growth and expansion. '2 70 In applying its independent equal protection analysis, the Alaska Supreme Court
should continue to draw upon the state's unique traditions and environment to legitimate its active judicial review.
Finally, there are two additional sources from which the court
can gain support for its independent analysis and for the independent
content to the equality protected in Alaska. These are the particular
words of the state constitutional text and the history of its enactment. 27 1 Here again the court in fact has relied on such bases in asserting independence in other areas. For example, in applying
standards higher than those required by the United States Supreme
267. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972); see Howard, supra note 6,
at 928-29.
268. Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971); see Galie, supra note 6, at 769-

71.
269. Note, DurationalResidency Requirements: The Alaska Experience, 6 UCLAALASKA

L. REv. 50 (1976). For a discussion of the Alaska right to travel and resi-

dency requirements, see Note, Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown: The Right to
Travel and the Constitutionalityof Continuous Residency Requirements, 2 ALASKA L.
REv. 339 (1985).
270. Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 16 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring)

(footnote omitted).
271. Howard, supra note 6, at 935-37; E Pluribus,supra note 6, at 181-86.
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Court regarding searches and seizures, the Alaska court has relied
upon the explicit protection for privacy contained in the state constitution as an important support.2 72 The Alaska Supreme Court has not
yet relied upon the distinct language of article I, section 1, or the history of its enactment indeveloping its equal protection analysis. Recently, however, Justice Burke has indicated in two concurring
opinions that the particular language and history of the state equal
protection guarantee should be utilized as a basis for independent state
decisions. In Schaefer v. Vest, 273 the court affirmed per curiam a lower
court ruling that the state's longevity bonus program violated federal
equal protection standards. Burke, then Chief Justice, concurred and
indicated that he would base the decision on independent state
grounds.2 74 Justice Burke felt that these grounds went further than
the federal guarantee:
Alaska's founding fathers were not content merely to echo the
requirements of the fourteenth amendment, which guarantees all
persons "equal protection of the laws." They intended to provide
the citizens of this state with broader protection than they are entitled to under the Constitution of the United States. Thus, they
adopted a provision that is quite different in its terminology, declaring "that all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law."
The proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention
make it abundantly clear
that this difference is one of substance,
275
rather than mere style.
To Justice Burke, the bonus program that rewarded only those residents who were domiciled in the territory prior to statehood was intended to accomplish exactly the opposite result from providing all
persons with equal rights and opportunites. 276 In another brief concurrence, Justice Burke has reiterated his view that the protection provided under the state constitution "appears to be greater than that
272.
273.
274.
275.

ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; see State Guarantees,supra note 218, at 234-35.
680 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1984).
Id. at 1172 (Burke, C.J., concurring).
Id. (quoting ALAsKA CONST. art. I., § 1) (emphasis added). Justice Burke

continued:
Delegate Awes, for example, in explaining this choice of language to the
Convention, stated: "We do mean all three [guarantees]. I think [such language] means [people] are entitled to equal rights, equal opportunities, and
equal protection under the law."

. .

. Delegate Johnson, phrasing it some-

what differently, stated: "There are two things that are provided for here.
One is that all persons are equal under the law and the other is that they are
entitled to equal rights and opportunities under the law. They are two separate and distinct things."
680 P.2d at 1172 (citations omitted).
276. Id.
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provided by the federal equal protection clause. '277 Thus it appears
that, having adopted an independent analytical approach, the Alaska
Supreme Court may expand the bases relied upon for the content and
legitimacy of the court's independent guarantee of equality.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Alaska initially approached equal protection issues as if the standards of the state and federal constitutions
were the same. By the 1970's, however, the court began to express
frustration with the increased doctrinal inconsistency of the United
States Supreme Court. The Alaska court took a partial step toward an
independent analysis in Isakson v. Rickey by adopting the Royster
Guano Co. standard as its own under the state constitution when considering challenges to economic regulatory statutes. Soon, however,
the court announced in State v. Erickson that it would apply a uniform, sliding scale analysis in all cases raising state equal protection
claims. After further refinement in State v. Ostrosky, the court has
settled on its analysis.
In considering equal protection claims, the Alaska court has concentrated on developing its unique analytical doctrine. Now that the
sliding scale approach is fully articulated, the court can turn to more
elaborately developing the content of equality in Alaska in light of the
text, history, and traditions that inform its judicial decisionmaking.
As the Alaska Supreme Court continues to apply its sliding scale approach independently, other jurisdictions would do well to take note.
Perhaps these northern lights are more than just an interesting phenomenon; perhaps they are a north star that could guide other courts.

277. Adams v. Pipeliners Union 798, 699 P.2d 343, 352 n.1 (Alaska 1985) (Burke,
J., concurring).

